New approaches to regulation have emerged to deal with inadequacies of traditional command and control systems. Such "new governance" mechanisms are designed to increase flexibility, improve participation, foster experimentation and deliberation, and accommodate complex multi-level systems. In many cases these mechanisms co-exist with conventional forms of regulation. As new forms of governance emerge in arenas regulated by conventional legal processes, a wide range of configurations is possible. The purpose of this paper is to provide a preliminary mapping of such relationships using examples drawn from the European Union and the United States. When the two processes are yoked together in a hybrid form, we might speak of a real transformation in the law. In other cases, the two systems may exist in parallel but not fuse together in a single system. Where both systems co-exist but do not fuse, there are numerous possible configurations and relationships among them. Thus, one might simply be used to launch the other, as when formal law is used to mandate a new approach. Or, they might operate independently yet both may have an effect on the same policy domain. Finally, in some areas one system may take over the field, either because new governance methods replace traditional law altogether, or because opposition to innovation halts efforts to employ new approaches. 1 The first water directive, passed in 1975, dealt with drinking water. Council Directive 75/440/EEC, 1975 O.
The European Union has regulated water quality for over 30 years 1 . In 2000, the Union launched a new and radical approach. The EU's Water Framework Directive emphasizes flexibility; takes account of Member State differences; adapts the regulatory program to the multi-level nature of EU governance; facilitates mutual learning, benchmarking and peer review; makes use of scoreboards to measure progress; and mixes binding legal rules and standards with non-binding forms of cooperation, information pooling, and guidance. The Directive mandates a process and structure for Member State action on water quality, requires that they achieve "good water status" in 15 years, and leaves the task of defining good status and many other key terms to subsequent action by Member States and the European Commission. The Directive set in motion a number of informal, horizontal processes while also initiating efforts to create more detailed legislation in some areas. 2 In a similar vein, the State of Wisconsin has introduced a novel approach to environmental law. Wisconsin's environmental regulators are experimenting with a new approach to ensuring that air remains clean and waters pure. While maintaining detailed clean air and water regulations, the Department of Natural Resources, under its "Green Tier" program, will waive or defer standard enforcement procedures for regulated industries that agree to develop different ways to achieve environmental goals as long as the chosen methods lead to results that exceed legally mandated standards. The result is a hybrid system in which innovation, negotiation and self-monitoring are fore-grounded while regulatory enforcement remains in the background as a default option. 3 The EU's Water Framework Directive and Wisconsin's Green Tier are just two examples of how new processes to carry out public objectives are changing the law.
Where regulatory goals have traditionally been sought exclusively through statutory enactments, administrative regulation, and judicial enforcement, we now see new processes emerging which range from informal consultation to highly formalized systems that seek to affect behavior but differ on many ways from traditional command and control regulation. These processes, which we will collectively label "new governance", may encourage experimentation; employ stakeholder participation to devise solutions; rely on broad framework agreements, flexible norms and revisable standards; and use benchmarks, indicators and peer review to ensure accountability.
There is a vigorous debate about new governance. Some think that these innovations should be used only in a very limited way to supplement traditional forms of regulation in areas in which command and control processes have not been effective. Others think that we are witnessing a major transformation in law and policy, and that the new governance "revolution" will end up changing all law as we know it. 4 We do not try to resolve this debate. But we recognize that something very significant is happening and that we are in a period in which change is occurring. The purpose of this paper is to help us understand the nature of that change and its implications for a yet tobe-glimpsed legal future.
In this paper, we begin the task of mapping relationships between conventional forms of regulation and a number of new governance approaches. As new forms of governance emerge in arenas regulated by conventional legal processes, a wide range of configurations is possible. When, as in the Water Framework Directive and Green Tier, the two processes become yoked together in a hybrid form and interact with each other, we might speak of a real transformation in the law. In other cases, the two systems may exist in parallel but not fuse together in a single system. Where both systems co-exist, there are numerous possible configurations and relationships among them. Thus, one might simply be used to launch the other, as when formal law is used to mandate a new approach. Or, they might operate independently yet both may have an effect on the same policy domain. Finally, in some areas one system may take over the field, either because new governance methods replace traditional law altogether, or because opposition to innovation halts efforts to employ new approaches. The purpose of this paper is to examine all such relationships using examples drawn from the European Union and the United States.
I: The Emergence of New Governance
Much has been written on the reasons for the emergence of new governance. Thus, these developments may be attributed to very basic changes in economy, polity and society, as well as to more technical innovations in public administration. In these accounts, as society becomes more complex and problems harder to solve, there is a need for more experimentation. Because stakeholders often have the knowledge needed to solve problems, increased participation becomes desirable. Because society changes and knowledge grows, all solutions to problems should be seen as provisional. In situations like this, it seems better to develop broad frameworks but let stakeholders develop concrete solutions based on easily revisable rules. Because traditional forms of democratic legitimacy may fail, it becomes necessary to provide other methods to ensure accountability. Because new technologies make it easier to secure data, get input from stakeholders, and monitor progress, new methods become possible that were not previously available. Finally, as more and more processes spread across traditional geographic boundaries and a need for coordination grows, new ways to manage multilevel regulatory processes are demanded. Similar developments can be seen in the US as the rise of new governance is facilitated by such factors as devolution to the states, increased public-private partnerships, attacks on the use of litigation, and the emergence of new managerial technologies. 7
II: Varieties of Coexistence
Our analysis uses stylized concepts of "new governance" and legal regulation or "law". 8 We contrast systems that rely on top-down control using fixed statutes, detailed rules, and judicial enforcement on the one hand, with a wide range of alternative methods to solve problems and affect behavior, on the other. We recognize that these stylized concepts mask real complexities and empirical variation. We use them in a provisional and arbitrary way and we recognize that substantial further work needs to be done to clarify terminology, secure empirical information, and develop a more sophisticated typology.
We hope this paper points the way to such work. 9 6 Scott and Trubek, supra note 5 7 Louise G. Trubek, New Governance and Soft Law in Health Care Reform, 3 IND. HEALTH L. REV.140, 151 (2006) . 8 Note that "new governance" as defined in this paper includes what others and we have sometimes called "soft law". See Trubek & Trubek, supra note 5. 9 It is important to note that the term "new" does not necessarily mean that the techniques so labeled are all recent in origin. Some of these techniques have existed for some time, often as informal processes. What is new really is the self-conscious and regularized use of these approaches as an alternative or supplement to traditional forms.
There are now many instances in which we can see new governance and law operating in the same policy domain. We call that situation coexistence. There are three basic ways they can coexist. When each is operating at the same time and contributing to a common objective but they have not merged, we describe them as complementary. When the newer forms of governance are designed to perform the same tasks as legal regulation and are thought to do it better, or otherwise there seems to be a necessary choice between systems, we speak of rivalry between the co-existing processes.
There is, however, a third category that we refer to as transformation. In this paper, we use that term to describe configurations in which new governance and traditional law are not only complementary; they also are integrated into a single system and the functioning of each element is necessary for the successful operation of the other. Because such hybrids represent the emergence of a new form of law, they are of special interest. The Water Framework Directive and Green Tier are examples of such hybridity and thus of transformation. 10 Table 1 shows these options. introduced with the intent of displacing older forms. But it can also occur unintentionally as when the creation of a newer mode makes it so hard to deploy traditional modes that they wither away. In such situations, we speak of rivalry.
In this paper, we look at the dynamics of co-existence and explore complementarity, rivalry, and transformation. In this analysis, we have classified EU and US examples according to the typology in Table 1 . This classification, based often on limited data, is provisional and subject to correction as we secure more information about these developments. 11
III: Complementarity
We can speak of the complementarity of new governance and legal regulation when both systems co-exist in the same policy domain and promote the same goals. 12 This configuration may occur in situations in which a complex social problem requires a variety of different forms of intervention. 13 11 While there has been considerable speculation about new governance and its relationship to legal regulation, there is very little empirical work on how these systems relate to one another. 12 This analysis draws heavily on de Búrca & Scott, supra note 9, in which the authors analyze various forms of "hybridity" between law and new governance. Their typology employs a similar functional analysis and identifies many of the forms of complementarity noted here. But they employ a broader definition of hybridity. For the reasons we have chosen to narrow the term and refer to hybrids as instances of transformation, see TAN 9, supra 13 A somewhat similar situation occurs when various "soft" or non-binding mechanisms are be used to develop normative commitments that eventually lead to the creation of "hard law" either though judicial interpretation or statutory innovation situations where new governance leads to new forms of traditional law. This is the classic use of "soft law" in international and EU Law. See: Francis Synder, Soft Law and Institutional Practice in the European Community, in THE CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE (Stephen Martin, ed. 1994). As these functions succeed one another, they don't neatly fit into the category of "coexistence".
A leading example of complementarity can be seen in the EU's efforts to combat discrimination against women in the workplace. Here, we can see the operation of three distinct systems that initially emerged independently of one another. These systems include a series of binding treaty articles and directives dealing with equality in the workplace and facilitating female participation, the European Employment Strategy (EES), and the European Structural Funds. Treaty articles make equality between the sexes as an "essential task" of the Community, 14 oblige the Community to "mainstream" gender issues, 15 grant the Council the right to prevent discrimination, 16 and demand equal opportunities at work. 17 The Charter of Fundamental Human Rights reaffirms the ban on all forms of discrimination, in particular those based on sex. 18 The directives establish legal rights to be free from discrimination in the workplace and mandate that Member
States create such rights as a matter of national law binding on employers and enforceable in national courts. 19 The EES, on the other hand, is a new governance process that employs non-binding guidelines, periodic reporting, multilateral surveillance, and exchange of best practices to increase employment and the quality of work. One of the goals of the EES is to foster national policies that will discourage gender discrimination and increase female labor market participation. While the directives operate at the level of individual cases, the EES operates to change national policy and employer attitudes. 20 Finally, the EU Structural Funds can be used in a way that complements both the directive and the EES by providing funding for projects that further the general goal of equal access for women such as improved day care facilities. 21 In a study of the operation of these three processes, Claire Kilpatrick has argued that not only are they operating in a complementary fashion, but, as their potential interaction becomes clearer to policy makers at the EU and Member State levels, conscious efforts are being made to increase complementarity. 22 Another example of possible complementarity can be seen in efforts to reduce racial disparities in health in the US. It has long been clear that some racial minorities have poorer health than the population as a whole. For some time, lawyers have sought to attack these results using litigation aimed at various racially discriminatory practices. But in the past these efforts have not proven very effective. In the meantime, efforts by the medical profession to use "total quality" type new governance techniques have begun to
show results in one area of racial inequality. It has long been known that certain racial The EU's Social Dialogue is a good example of the creation of an alternative route to conventional legal regulation that is not designed to work with, or displace, the traditional legal route. 26 handled through two forms of legal regulation: the tort system and physician licensing.
Medical malpractice litigation uses tort law to secure compensation for victims and the licensing process is supposed to weed out doctors with significant records of medical error. However, many think malpractice litigation is an excessively costly way to compensate victims which has little overall impact on the quality of health care. And the licensing process has not been very effective in reducing error.
As a result, efforts have been made to create a rival system to deter error, compensate victims, and improve quality. This system uses such new governance techniques as "regulation by information" through the publication of data on physicians' results, fiscal 27 Note that the kind of bargaining between workers and employers over work-related issues is widespread in Europe and goes back a long way. incentives for good performance by hospitals and clinics, alternative forms of victim compensation through administrative processes similar to workers compensation, and conflict avoidance through informal methods to explain and apologize for error. 28 These two systems currently operate as rivals. Some tout the new governance approach as an improvement on the traditional legal regulatory and litigation rout and urge that it be expanded and consolidated while others see it as a way to displace the traditional remedies and weaken patient protection. At the moment, however, the systems offer rival routes to error reduction and compensation. Table 2 sets forth in ideal-typical form the differences and similarities among these three forms of EU Governance.
Insert Table 2 here ii) The Water Framework Directive and the Transformation of Law
The WFD includes both traditional regulation and new governance. It is this combination, and the way the elements may interact, that has led several scholars to see the WFD as a leading example of a hybrid form of governance and thus as the transformation of law. 39 The WFD arose out of dissatisfaction with traditional methods of EU environmental lawmaking. The EU has been regulating water quality for some time using classical directives and the CCM. By the late 1990s there were 11 separate water directives in place. However, at the same time, there was widespread dissatisfaction with EU environmental law in general and water quality regulation in particular. In general, it was thought that the centralized and detailed directive approach failed to take into account the differences in local conditions, was not well suited to the reality of multi-level governance in which most implementation is done by the Member States, did not make proper use of economic incentives, and put too much strain on the EU's limited capacity both to issue rules and to secure compliance with detailed directives. 40 All these concerns were present in the area of water quality management in the EU. This task has always been complex due to the great difference in the ecologies of the various Member States and the differences in their approaches to environmental protection. It was becoming more complex due to increased public awareness, growing demand for water by users, the privatization of water distribution systems in many countries, emergence of new scientific knowledge, and controversies concerning the impact of chemical discharge and agricultural run-off on ground and surface waters. 41 The WFD emerged from a long process that involved a complex interaction among the pooling; river basin management plans; non-binding guidance documents produced collectively by the Member States and the Commission with expert input; non-binding guidelines produced by the Commission following comitology procedures; and specific requirements for stakeholder and public participation in all aspects of implementation.
The WFD employs two types of non-binding guidance. The first is non-binding guidelines that can be set forth by the Commission using comitology procedures. 53 As far as we can tell, this authority has not been used to date. The second are guidance documents prepared by horizontal working groups under the CIS. They have been used extensively.
Guidance documents are the core of the CIS and one of its most interesting features.
These are detailed, non-binding, and revisable documents that provide guidance for the performance of specific tasks that are mandated by the WFD. They provide suggestions on how to carry out various implementation tasks as well as outlining possible common approaches to key technical matters. They can be very long and quite detailed. 54
The documents are created by Working Groups made up of representatives of the Member States and experts. They deal with issues such as how to organize public participation, how to classify lakes and coastal waters, and how to establish precise and
common definitions for open-ended terms like "good water quality" and "good ecological status". 55 The EC currently lists 14 such documents that have been completed. 56 To illustrate the role of guidance documents as well as the complexity of the For these reasons, it is easy to see why several leading scholars think that the WFD illustrates the emergence of hybrid forms and the potential of such forms to lead to better problem-solving and law-making. By allowing as much national diversity as possible while holding Member States to measurable results in the long run; by tapping into the expertise of 27 Member States; by ensuring widespread public participation; and by facilitating information pooling and peer review; the WFD creates the potential for better environmental law and more effective management of water quality. Although the WFD process is still underway and much more needs to be done before the structures and measures it mandates are fully operational, and while we lack the detailed empirical evidence needed to determine if the system really will achieve all its ambitious goals, . 60 Although the SGP as originally conceived failed to accomplish the overriding goal of deterring excessive deficits, reforms in the process and changes in national economic policies have been made in an effort to improve effectiveness. The most important changes broadened the kinds of economic data to be used in determining the existence of an excessive deficit and loosened the supposedly automatic nature of the corrective procedures. For a more or less optimistic analysis, see the speech on the subject given by framework entities might lack incentives to self-regulate, while without the more flexible new governance processes they would not be able to carry out some innovative strategies. 62 The hope is that the resulting hybrid will lead to a higher degree of environmental protection that could be achieved only with command and control methods.
A similar situation exists in the interrelation between the EU's Race Discrimination Law and the Action Plan against discrimination. Gráinne de Búrca notes that these initiatives It is important to note the ways the Race Discrimination case seems to differ from the employment discrimination story as told by Kilpatrick. These differences allow us provisionally to classify the former as an instance of transformation and the latter merely as complementarity. In both cases the two systems were initially developed independently. In employment discrimination, they seem to operate independently as well, performing different but complementary functions. Each could do its work without the other. But in the Race case, one system seems to be needed for the other to become fully effective. In this situation, the open-ended nature of the legal obligations created a need for mechanisms to give these concepts effective meaning and specificity. Without some such mechanism the Directive's broad mandate would have little effect. The several new governance modalities described by de Búrca create a process in which specific 62 This is similar to what Sabel & Zeitlin , supra note 5, refer to as "penalty default" but here the penalty is merely strict scrutiny by the regulator under traditional law. 63 de Búrca, supra note 5.
26
obligations and rules can be developed and changed over time 64 . As the Directive with its broad norms and the various new governance processes become more integrated, a true hybrid system of new governance and traditional regulatory law methods might be emerging. Table 3 shows that that there are examples of complementarity, rivalry and hybridity on both sides of the Atlantic. 
VII Dynamics
In developing a general theory of new governance and legal regulation, it is important both to identify the possible range of outcomes when these two systems co-exist and understand the dynamics that may lead to each outcome. A provisional list of outcomes includes:
• conscious integration succeeds 64 See id.
• conscious integration fails Against Discrimination, initially designed as separate systems, appear to be moving together in ways that could lead to a hybrid system ex post. Genuine and effective commitment to social objectives -In some cases, it may appear that the move to new governance is not a way to increase the effectiveness of social protection, but rather a smokescreen behind which what actually occurs is deregulation and abandonment of commitments. To the extent this is perceived to be the case, the effort at integration is likely to fail. One way to ensure that that perception does not take hold is to demonstrate the effectiveness of the new procedures.
Maintenance of legal remedies as a default position -Often, new governance mechanisms are introduced as an alternative to command and control regulation because they appear to be more flexible, revisable, experimental, and/or participatory that traditional legal remedies. One way to guarantee that these processes are not a form of covert deregulation is to keep the legal remedies in place as a fall-back so that those who currently benefit from legal rights have the confidence that they will not lose if they accept the new governance alternatives.
b) Displacement
There a number of factors that can explain why co-existence fails and one system is displaced by the other. Among them are:
Low cost-effectiveness of one system compared to the other -This can explain why new governance displaces law, or vice versa. New governance systems may prove to be significantly more cost effective than traditional regulation. But the opposite can also be the case: new governance processes may seem to be very time consuming and not sufficiently effective to serve as a viable alternative.
Resistance of key actors to change: When new governance is put forward, whether as part of an integrated system or as an alternative to legal regulation, key actors may sabotage
The Open Method of Co-ordination in Action: Theoretical Promise, Empirical Realities, Reform Strategy, in Zeitlin & Pochet (eds.), supra note 5.
the effort either because they fail to understand the new processes or think they will lose if they are introduced. Such "foot-dragging" may come from bureaucracies that play a central role in legal regulation or from interest groups convinced that the governance innovations are disguised efforts to weaken their position.
IX: Towards a "new governance theory of law": rethinking functions, values, and actors
This paper has argued that the emergence of new governance in some cases is transforming law by allowing the creation of new forms of law that differ from traditional top-down, command and control systems. We have offered a preliminary typology that would allow us to identify and analyze such "transformed" systems and described a few examples of the new forms of law that are emerging.
We hope this paper will lead to a more thorough and ambitious inquiry that would allow us better to understand these developments and assess their significance. We see such an effort as having several dimensions. These include a critical analysis of the failures of traditional regulation, an empirical inquiry to identify transformations, a sociological analysis that would explain why these changes are occurring and trace their impact on various interests and groups, a theoretical analysis that would the relation between new forms of law and traditional legal values, and a policy analysis that explores both the feasibility and desirability of greater use of such hybrid forms and the role of various actors in such efforts.
In any such inquiry, we would need to examine values traditionally associated with law such as accountability, transparency, fairness, equality, participation and the stabilization of expectations. At the same time, we have to look at the values said to flow from deploying new governance: these include an ability to handle diversity, facilitate experimentation, promote learning, and allow flexibility and revisablity. And we would have to rethink some of the traditional categories in legal thought such as principal-agent 
